Robert Brenner wrote an article titled “The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism” for the July-August 1977 New Left Review that repeated his thesis that capitalism originated in the British countryside and had little to do with 17th and 18th century colonialism. In the name of defending classical Marxism, he also downplayed 20th century neocolonialism–his reaction to the perceived Third Worldist excesses of the 1960s. My comrade, the late Jim Blaut, saw it this way:
Robert Brenner is one of the most widely known of Euro-Marxist historians. His influence stems from the fact that he supplied a crucial piece of doctrine at a crucial time. Just after the end of the Vietnam War, radical thought was strongly oriented toward the Third World and its struggles, strongly influenced by Third-World theorists like Cabral, Fanon, Guevara, James, Mao, and Nkrumah, and thus very much attracted to theories of social development which tend to displace Europe from its pivotal position as the center of social causation and social progress, past and present. Euro-Marxism of course disputed this, and Euro-Marxists, while strong in their support of present-day liberation struggles, nonetheless insisted as they always had done that the struggles and changes taking place in the center of the system, the European world, are the true determinants of world historical changes; socialism will rise in the heartlands of advanced European capitalism, or perhaps everywhere all at once; but socialism will certainly not arrive first in the backward, laggard, late-maturing Third World.
Brenner took aim at “dependency theory”, an analysis of the imperialist system developed by Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran in “Monopoly Capital”. Other writers associated with this school included Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin. Basically, the theory stressed the division of the world into core and periphery nations and described the role of capitalism in the Third World as the “development of underdevelopment” to use A.G. Frank’s words, an idea that seemed uncontroversial to me after visiting Tanzania and Zambia in 1990.
Brenner’s article starts out by repeating some of his ideas on the origins of capitalism and then proceeds to a slashing attack on the dependency school whose ideas allegedly grew out of their failure to understand that capitalism owed nothing to slavery, colonialism and other forms of primitive accumulation in Latin America, India and elsewhere. From not understanding the key role of British lease farming in the 17th century, you end up tail-ending the Third World bourgeoisie. It must be understood that fears over scratches turning into gangrene were very pervasive in the 1970s, even in the academic left.
One of the key elements of the dependency school is “unequal exchange”, an idea generally associated with Samir Amin. Basically, it is just another way to describe the phenomenon of super-exploitation. Through their control of markets and natural resources and their superior technology and productivity of labor, as well as their military superiority, imperialist nations are able to extract profits that would not ordinarily be available from more industrialized countries. Brenner will have none of this, as should be obvious from his discussion of Immanuel Wallerstein:
Wallerstein seems to have two modes of explaining the putative transfer of surplus from core to the periphery: one directly ‘economic’, the other ‘political’. Thus, he states: ‘The division of the world-economy involves a hierarchy of occupational tasks, in which tasks requiring higher levels of skill and greater capitalization are reserved for higher ranking areas. Since a capitalist world-economy essentially rewards accumulated capital, including human capital, at a higher rate than “raw” labor power, the geographical maldistribution of these occupational skills involves a strong trend toward self-maintenance. The forces of the marketplace reinforce them rather than undermine them’. At the same time, Wallerstein argues that the system of labour control/rewards to labour gives rise to strong states in the core and weak ones in the periphery. As a consequence, the strong states are able to assure, ultimately by force it appears, an unequal economic relationship between the core economies and those of the periphery. ‘In [the core] states, the creation of a strong state machinery . . . serves . . . as a mechanism to protect disparities that have arisen within the world system’. ‘Once we get a difference in the strength of the state-machineries, we get the operation of “unequal exchange” which is enforced by strong states on weak ones, by core states on peripheral areas. Thus [agricultural] capitalism [of the early modern period] involves not only appropriation of the surplus-value by an owner from a laborer, but an appropriation of surplus of the whole world-economy by core areas’.
Last March, in conjunction with a discussion of “crisis theory” on the Introduction to Marxism mailing list on Yahoo, I read Rick Kuhn’s biography of Henryk Grossman—winner of the Isaac Deutscher Prize last year—and Grossman’s most important work “The Law of Accumulation and Collapse of the Capitalist System”. While most of the scholarly attention, including Kuhn’s, is focused on Grossman’s attempt to develop a theory of crisis out of Marx’s examination of the organic composition of capital, there is a very important discussion of the role of imperialism in mitigating the impact of crisis. It appears in part two of the final section of Grossman’s book, titled “Restoring Profitability through World Market Domination.”
After having read it the third time at this point, I am struck by its affinity with dependency theory. I am also struck by Grossman’s ability to ground his ideas in Marx’s Capital. Ironically, despite the tendency to see Lenin’s writings on imperialism as a fountainhead, I find Grossman’s ideas more grounded in basic Marxist theory and a useful rejoinder to Brenner’s claims on orthodoxy.
Robert Brenner to the contrary, Grossman regards Karl Marx’s scope as far wider than the British countryside.
Yet Marx himself repeatedly underlined the colossal importance of foreign trade to the development of capitalism; in 1859 he proposed a six-book structure for his investigations of the capitalist economy and intended the ‘world market’ to be one of the six. Although the structure of the work was later changed, its object of inquiry remained basically the same. In Capital we find the ‘creation of the world market’ listed as one of the ‘three cardinal facts of capitalist production’ (1956, p. 266). Elsewhere Marx writes: ‘Capitalist production does not exist at all without foreign commerce’ (1956, p. 474).
Grossman also pinpoints a highly revealing passage in chapter 21 of Marx’s “Theories of Surplus Value” that establishes foreign trade as a sine qua non for capital accumulation:
But it is only foreign trade, the development of the market to a world market, which causes money to develop into world money and abstract labour into social labour. Abstract wealth, value, money, hence abstract labour, develop in the measure that concrete labour becomes a totality of different modes of labour embracing the world market.
“Thus”, according to Grossman, “the limits on the production of surplus value are extended; the breakdown of capitalism is postponed.”
Brenner seems to have problems with Wallerstein’s assertion that “The division of the world-economy involves a hierarchy of occupational tasks, in which tasks requiring higher levels of skill and greater capitalization are reserved for higher ranking areas.” You can find exactly the same analysis in Grossman:
Due to mass production British industry, which was the workshop of the world down to the 1870s, could carry through a division of labour, increases in productivity and cost savings to a level that was unattainable elsewhere. Whereas weaving and spinning were originally combined, later they were separated. This resulted in geographical specialisation. Burnley made the traditional calico prints, Blackburn clothed India and China, Preston manufactured fine cottons.
In the subsection titled “Foreign trade and the sale of commodities at prices of production deviating from values”, Grossman makes a strong relationship between the ability of the capitalist system to extract super-profits from the colonial world where the organic composition of capital is lower. In other words, he is calling attention to the presence of the production of absolute surplus value (lengthened work-day, child labor, etc.) in countries such as India or the Congo. In industrialized countries, the production of relative surplus value is facilitated by the wide-scale use of advanced technologies which enables the imperialist countries to dominate the markets in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This advantage is described in language startlingly similar to the “unequal exchange” referred to by Brenner:
International trade is not based on an exchange of equivalents because, as on the national market, there is a tendency for rates of profit to be equalised. The commodities of the advanced capitalist country with the higher organic composition will therefore be sold at prices of production higher than value; those of the backward country at prices of production lower than value. This would mean the formation of an average rate of profit of 18.5 per cent so that European commodities will sell for a price of 118.5 instead of 116. In this way circulation on the world market involves transfers of surplus value from the less developed to the more developed capitalist countries because the distribution of surplus value is determined not by the number of workers employed in each country but by the size of the functioning capital.
To establish his consistency with Marx’s writings on this topic, Grossman cites chapter 20 of “Theories of Surplus Value” which states: “The relationship between labour days of different countries may be similar to that existing between skilled, complex labour and unskilled, simple labour within a country. In this case, the richer country exploits the poorer one…” You will note that Karl Marx writes, “the richer country exploits the poorer one…”, something that is anathema to Robert Brenner who understands exploitation strictly in terms of the relationship between capitalist and worker.
Grossman continues:
In effect price formation on the world market is governed by the same principles that apply under a conceptually isolated capitalism. The latter anyway is merely a theoretical model; the world market, as a unity of specific national economies, is something real and concrete. Today the prices of the most important raw materials and final products are determined internationally, in the world market. We are no longer confronted by a national level of prices but a level determined on the world market. In a conceptually isolated capitalism entrepreneurs with an above average technology make a surplus profit (a rate of profit above the average) when they sell their commodities at socially average prices. Likewise on the world market, the technologically advanced countries make a surplus profit at the cost of the technologically less developed ones.
This paragraph is about as succinct a definition of imperialism as you are going to find. And once again, Grossman finds support for his analysis in Marx’s writings—in this case Volume 3 of Capital:
Capitals invested in foreign trade can yield a higher rate of profit, because, in the first place, there is competition with commodities produced in other countries with inferior production facilities, so that the more advanced country sells its goods above their value even though cheaper than the competing countries. In so far as the labour of the more advanced country is here realised as labour of a higher specific weight, the rate of profit rises, because labour which has not been paid as being of a higher quality, is sold as such … As regards capitals invested in colonies, etc, on the other hand, they may yield higher rates of profit for the simple reason that the rate of profit there is higher due to backward development, and likewise the exploitation of labour, because of the use of slaves, coolies, etc.
You will note that Grossman refers to backward development, a contradiction in terms. How can there be “backward development” unless of course you agree with A. G. Frank’s characterization of imperialism as the “development of underdevelopment”. And to cinch the connection with the dependency school, Grossman refers to “unequal exchange” in the very next paragraph:
In the examples cited above the gain of the more advanced capitalist countries consists in a transfer of profit from the less developed countries. it is irrelevant whether the latter are capitalist or non-capitalist. It is not a question of the realisation of surplus value but of additional surplus value which is obtained through competition on the world market through unequal exchange, or exchange of non-equivalents.
Finally, Grossman has no use for the idea that capitalism can be a source of modernization and progress in the colonial world, stating:
Kautsky sees the essence of imperialism in a striving to conquer the non-capitalist agrarian parts of the world. He therefore sees imperialism as merely an episode in the history of capitalism that will pass with the industrialisation of those parts of the world. This conception is totally false. Imperialism must be understood in the specific form that Luxemburg gives to it in her theory of the role of the non-capitalist countries. Imperialist antagonisms subsist even among the capitalist states in their relations to one another. Far from being merely an episode that belongs to the past, imperialism is rooted in the essence of capitalism at advanced stages of accumulation. Imperialist tendencies become stronger in the course of accumulation, and only the overthrow of capitalism will abolish them altogether.
As I have stated in previous articles on the Brenner thesis, it had the unfortunate effect of fostering Kautskyist tendencies in the left academy which took the form of looking for the kind of dynamic growth associated with 18th and 19th century Europe. Colin Leys is just one example of this. Starting out as a dependency theorist, Leys was converted by the brilliance of Brenner’s 1977 NLR article:
Brenner, correctly in my view, stresses the centrality of the class relations which [Adam] Smith took as given. On this view, what is decisive for the development of capitalist production relations is the prior configuration and character of classes–for instance, the availability or otherwise of ‘free’ labour, the respective political power of non-landed and landed classes affecting the possibility of capital investment in land, and so on.
Applying the Brenner thesis to Kenya, Leys came up with some startling observations. He said that “Passenger road transportation was also in African hands by 1977 as were tour companies, laundries and dry cleaning, and a rapidly growing share of the hotel and restaurant sectors.” This exciting development led Leys to endorse comments made by an unidentified Kenyan state official, “In 15 years, if the political climate of Kenya and the world economy stay stable, 90% of manufacturing will be Kenyan owned.” All this rapid growth in the dry cleaning and tour business will amount “an example of a ‘systematical combination of moments’ conducive to the transition to the capitalist mode of production.”
Such rubbish was quite common in the 1980s as a left academy revolted against the dependency school which supposedly had gone astray from classical Marxism. My response has been to react against the reaction in keeping with Grossman’s insight that “Imperialist tendencies become stronger in the course of accumulation, and only the overthrow of capitalism will abolish them altogether.”
This very interesting piece draws attention to a neglected aspect of Grossman’s work, his account of unequal exchange in foreign trade as a counterveiling tendency to the tendency for the rate of profit to fall.
This matter is also briefly discussed in Henryk Grossman and the recovery of Marxism University of Ilinois Press, Urbana and Chicago 2007, pp. 133, 263-264 and in more detail in ‘Henryk Grossman on capitalist expansion and imperialism; International socialist review 56, November-December 2007, pp. 57-66, on the web at http://www.isreview.org/issues/56/feat-grossman.shtml. A contributor to OPE-L also drew attention to the issue, http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/ope-l/2005m10/msg00157.htm and http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/ope-l/2006m08/msg00030.htm.
Grossman’s approach has common features with the treatment of unequal exchange, as a consequence of the transformation of values into prices, by Arghiri Emmanuel in his Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade Monthly Review Press, New York 1972. There is less affinity with Frank and Wallerstein.
Grossman’s use of Marx’s phrase “due to backward development” can’t be equated with Frank’s “development of underdevelopment”. The apparent similarity is an artifact of the translation. The German does not suggest that development has gone into reverse in “countries with inferior production facilities”. An alternative translation of “wegen der niedrigen Entwicklung” that avoids this implication is “because of the low [level of] development”.
Grossman certainly regarded unequal exchange as one of several counterveiling tendencies associated with imperialism. Unlike the dependentistas, he did not see it as the explanation of imperialism.
The passage that criticises Kautsky (below) can be read as a critique of ideas Kautsky shares with dependency theory. Paraphrasing this interpretation of Grossman: Kautsky says imperialism is mainly about the relationships between advanced capitalist countries and non-capitalist parts of the world. This is wrong. Imperialism is primarily about competition between imperialist powers.
“Kautsky sees the essence of imperialism in a striving to conquer the non-capitalist agrarian parts of the world. He therefore sees imperialism as merely an episode in the history of capitalism that will pass with the industrialisation of those parts of the world. This conception is totally false. Imperialism must be understood in the specific form that Luxemburg gives to it in her theory of the role of the non-capitalist countries. Imperialist antagonisms subsist even among the capitalist states in their relations to one another. Far from being merely an episode that belongs to the past, imperialism is rooted in the essence of capitalism at advanced stages of accumulation. Imperialist tendencies become stronger in the course of accumulation, and only the overthrow of capitalism will abolish them altogether.” [Source Grossman The law of accumulation http://www.marxists.org/archive/grossman/1929/breakdown/ch03.htm
Comment by Rick Kuhn — June 11, 2008 @ 11:37 pm
Louis I think you need to qualify your view that Grossman is a dependency theorist. Dependency theory says that unequal exchange has become THE most important means of of capital accumulation at the center. This is saying that it has overcome the TRPF and that the class struggles that take place today are at the level of exchange and can be resolved at the level of exchange. This shifts the axis of class struggle to that between rich and poor nations and sustains the exchange level ideology of national populism such as we find in Bolivia, Venezuela and Nepal. But Grossman like Marx never says that unequal exchange is capable of permanently postponing the TRPF and in fact imperialism uses unequal exchange to reap cheap raw materials and labor to feed the increased technical advances at the center. From the US in the 19th century to China today extensive exploitation is supplanted by intensive exploitation increasing labor productivity and generating the basis for international class struggle.
Comment by Dave — June 11, 2008 @ 11:48 pm
one thing, i think you’re missing though, is that capitalism inofitself, developed primarily in the english countryside, and did not develop anywhere else in the world.
As Ellen Woods points out in her book “The orgins of capitalism: a longer view”, this is not a simply eurocentric point of view, this is just how hisotry played out. The reason that in Capital, England is the most obvious example is because England was where capitalism developed. It did not devlop in continental europe, it didnt devlop in any other continent. To wish otherwise, is as she points out, to end in complelty false theortical assumptions about the world, which ends up skewering any practice of historical materialism.
The truth is that i do not know brenner as much as i do his collegues woods and comminel and their arguement is that we must be specfic on how capitalism developed, in order to look for how to destroy it. Accepting that capitalism devloped in england, under specfic conditions, does not mean that third world theorists, such as mao and fanon are wrong about their theories. It just means that the logic of capital is a logic that has a specfic hisotry. Euro-centrism is wrong, but to be specfic about things does not a euro-centrist make.
Comment by Jeremias — June 12, 2008 @ 3:30 pm
I don’t know what to make of Jeremias’s comment since it accepts Wood’s version of the origins of capitalism at face value. I have written extensively about these questions both on this blog and elsewhere. Just click “transition debate” on the right side of page to see more.
Comment by louisproyect — June 12, 2008 @ 3:35 pm
Louis, first of all let me state that I know nothing of Henryk Grossman. That being said, I would like to know what is so specific about capitalism if it is mainly driven by colonialism and interstate unevenness of power relationships? Brenner’s critique of dependency theorists was based on this premise, that capitalism was different and needed to be understood on its differences not its similarities. He rejected dependency theorists substitution of class for core/periphery. He states; “they fail to take into account either the way in which class structures, once established, will in fact determine the course of economic development or underdevelopment over an epoch, or the way in which these class structures emerge: as the outcome of class struggles whose results are incomprehensible in terms of market forces”. He called them neo-Smithian because they assumed the very thing that needed explanation: class relations. If one accepts, as dependency theorists do, that capitalism is the result of mercantilist trade and colonial domination. What is it that is specific to capitalism? Is it as Adam Smith said “humans have a natural propensity to barter, truck and sell”, and therefore, capitalism is as natural as breathing? Or, is the class relationships that capitalism produces, both in the core and as it spread to the periphery the true source of its power and of its oppression?
Comment by brad — June 12, 2008 @ 7:42 pm
I refer Brad to my blog articles grouped under the tag “transition debate”. I also refer him to articles here (there is some overlap).
http://www.columbia.edu/%7Elnp3/mydocs/origins.htm
Here’s a sample from the very first thing I ever wrote on Brenner at:
http://www.columbia.edu/%7Elnp3/mydocs/origins/brenner_thesis.htm
Robert Brenner was often linked with Ernesto Laclau and Eugene Genovese in the 1980s. Although not quite forming a school, the three were widely regarded as upholding a classical tough-minded version of Marxism as opposed to the sort of wooly-headed populism that marched udner the banner of “dependency theory”. What they shared in common was a belief that the “mode of production” was key. If the system did not revolve around free labor and did not exhibit technological innovation driven by the lash of competition, then it did not deserve the name of capitalism. Social inequality was not sufficient.
(Of the three, Brenner is the only one who still has an affiliation with Marxism. Laclau dumped Marxism for a version of post-Marxism called “Radical Democracy” that he co-developed with Chantal Mouffe. It serves as the ideological underpinning for much of the NGO-oriented experiments in “civil society” in Latin American today. Genovese’s evolution was more extreme. He started out as a “primacy of class” Marxist with hostility to black nationalism and feminism of the sort found in figures like Todd Gitlin, but eventually broke with the radical movement entirely. Today he is best described as a Roman Catholic southern agrarian reactionary. All sharing a background in 1960s Marxism, Genovese, David Horowitz and Ronald Radosh are among the most active and impassioned enemies of the left in the USA today.)
With these connections in mind, it is interesting to turn to a paper written by Shearer Davis Bowman in the Oct. ’80 American Historical Review titled “Antebellum Planters and Vormarz Junkers in Comparative Perspective.” To set the context for his comparison, Bowman cites Genovese as arguing for “the genuine conservatism of the planters and proslavery thought by insisting upon the ‘precapitalist’ character of the Old South’s ‘paternalistic’ master-slave relation and the consequent ‘prebourgeois’ outlook of antebellum planters–’the closest thing to feudal lords imaginable in a nineteenth-century bourgeois republic.’”
By this criterion, the Junkers were just as ‘prebourgeois.’ The term “Junker” is derived from the Middle High German “young nobleman” and designates both the noble and nonnoble owners of legally privileged estates (Rittengüter) in Prussia’s six eastern provinces, the breadbasket of modern Germany. Bowman identifies the similarities between the slave-states and these provinces in terms of class relations:
“Although the legal and racial status of slaves on a plantation was certainly quite different from that of the laborers on a Junker estate (before as well as after the end of hereditary bondage in 1807), there were significant parallels between the productive purposes to which menials on plantations and Ritterguter were put and between the ways in which they were governed. Each work force was subject to the personal, nearly despotic, authority of the owner, and each worked to produce cash crops for foreign and domestic markets. While Southern planters were growing cotton or tobacco for shipment to Liverpool or New York, for example, East Elbian Junkers were producing wheat or wool for shipment to London or Berlin. At mid-century most plantations and Ritterguter also achieved a high, cost-efficient level of self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs as well. The functional and structural analogies between the plantation and the Rittergut are crucial to a comparative study of planters and Junkers, because these estates and their work forces constituted the foundations of their owners’ wealth, political influence, social status, and, in many instances, even their self-esteem.”
While Brenner makes a strict linkage between capitalist farmers exploiting wage labor, Bowman points out that the Junkers were keen to make improvements to their land where labor was anything but free. Captain Carl von Wulffen-Pietzpuhl, writing in 1845, urged the creation of model farms so that his fellow Junkers could explore “the advancement of Prussia’s practical agriculture”. He declared that “the most rational” farmer managed to use “land and soil most effectively” and that the “most important aspect of rational agriculture” could be “reduced to the art of producing the cheapest dung.” (And this was over a century in advance of the introduction of electronic mailing lists.)
The Junkers lord tended to have a view of himself as a kindly paterfamilias attending to the welfare of his faithful people, just like the American southern slave-owning class. While the slavocracy was able to impose its rule through outright ownership, the German oppressors had various labor codes–some extracted in the guise of “reforms” to keep his subjects in line. The proper way to regard both systems is as a mixture of economic control driven by the need for a capitalist gentry to support its life-style through the mass production of agricultural commodities, and political control based on forced labor. Reactionary authoritarian beliefs wed to militarism did not prevent these ruling class elites from extracting every bit of surplus from their properties through a combination of technological innovation and forced labor.
So were they precapitalist or capitalist?
MEIJI RESTORATION
Turning to Japan, the question of whether capitalist agriculture is a requirement for the advent of capitalism in general becomes even more problematic. Japanese Marxist scholarship has been the site of intense debates inspired by the Sweezy-Dobbs exchange. The Meiji restoration of the late 19th century is widely seen as the advent of the contemporary economic system, but there is scant evidence of bourgeois transformation of agriculture.
In “The Meiji Landlord: Good or Bad” (Journal of Asian Studies, May ’59), R.P. Dore dates the controversy as arising in the 1930s, long before Dobbs, Sweezy and Brenner stepped into the ring. The Iwanami Symposium on the
Development of Japanese Capitalism, held in 1932, marks the starting point of a sustained effort to date the transformation of Japan from a feudal to a capitalist society. Especially problematic was the role of class relations in the countryside, which never went through the radical restructuring of Brenner’s 16th century England.
Referring to Hirano Yoshitarö’s “The Structure of Japanese Capitalism” Dore writes:
“Hirano’s work contains a good deal of original research concerning the economic facts of the agrarian structure of the early Meiji, and the creation of a highly dependent class of tenant farmers. The landlords of Hirano, for example, preserved the semi-feudal social relations of the countryside which provided the necessary groundbase for the peculiarly distorted form of capitalism which developed in Japan. The high rents, maintained by semi-feudal extra-economic pressures, not only helped to preserve this semi-feudal base intact (by making capitalist agriculture unprofitable) they also contributed to the rapid process of primitive capital accumulation which accounted for the speed of industrial development. Thus the landlords were to blame for the two major special characteristics of Japanese capitalist development–its rapidity and its distorted nature.”
Gosh, this is enough to make your head spin. Here we have a situation in which, according to one of the deans of Japanese Marxist scholarship, semi-feudal relations in the countryside served to accelerate Japanese capitalist development. Just the opposite of what Brenner alleges to be the secret of English hyper-capitalist success. Something doesn’t add up here, does it?
Comment by louisproyect — June 12, 2008 @ 8:08 pm
My eyes glaze over a bit when I read these debates, which may be interminable in principle, but it would seem to me that the old anthropological distinction between independent invention (rare) and diffusion (less rare) apply here–the conditions under which a social system type originates for the first time are likely not to be the same as those under which its features spread elsewhere, whether through conquest or imitation. Cf. linguistic calques, like “marché à puces”>”flea market” or “skyscraper”>”gratte-ciel.”
Once one society adopts centralized kingship with its military advantages, the neighbors had better do the same or else. See I Samuel 8 for an example. You can usually find a partial (Protestant) Bible in the drawers of hotel rooms, and also on line.
Once the English adopted modern capitalism, with its productive and revolutionary potential, their rivals could not afford to dither. If I recall the Marxist jargon of my misspent youth, the revolutionary formerly known as Bronshtein called it “uneven and combined development.”
Comment by Grumpy Old Man — June 13, 2008 @ 5:08 am
“Marché aux puce.” J’ai le visage, mais pas la politique, rouge.
Comment by Grumpy Old Man — June 13, 2008 @ 5:35 am
Merde. Puces.
Comment by Grumpy Old Man — June 13, 2008 @ 5:35 am
G’day Louis,
Quoth Grossman: “the strong states are able to assure, ultimately by force it appears, an unequal economic relationship between the core economies and those of the periphery. ‘In [the core] states, the creation of a strong state machinery . . . serves . . . as a mechanism to protect disparities that have arisen within the world system’. ‘Once we get a difference in the strength of the state-machineries, we get the operation of “unequal exchange” which is enforced by strong states on weak ones, by core states on peripheral areas.”
I remember banging on at you and Rakesh about the role the ‘information economy’ plays in validating the analysis and exacerbating the dynamic. Once data (whether Windows or Sex in the City) makes its bones (fetches its production costs), it’s costlessness henceforth allows it to trade for the rest of the world’s real surplus value (in the form of commodities, textiles, electronics and human services). The capacity of the US (via the Intellectual Property peak body via The US Trade Representative via the Uruguay Round of ’86 via TRIPS – hence via the power of an ever more mercantilist/corporate state in great need of a new regime of accumulation after the wake-up call that was the late 1970s) to standardise a globally enforced IP regime and attain incredible monopoly rent periods is precisely central to this pillage, as it amounts to trading above-value for below-value.
Could such a reading of our time not amount to a modest beginning to an all-in-one class analysis, dependency theory and inclusion of information into Marxian categories?
Comment by Rob Schaap — June 15, 2008 @ 3:27 am
Louis>
1) i dont have my copy of the ‘orgins of capitalism’ in front of me (its in toronto, and im living in bogota), but otoh, in all that ive read on your comments, ive not seen anything that would indicate make a refutaion of woods work in yours (true, i havent read all of your work, but from what i’ve read…). All your comments indicate a disparagement of brenner and woods, but without giving specfic arguements.
2) as Grumpy old man indicates the point of brenner and woods is that capitalism commenced in England. It is obvious to any anthropoligist, sociologist or histoicist (worth their salt) that once something happens the process of replication will not happen exactly the same way. The importance of wood and brenner is in their isolation of the emergence of capitalism for the very first time, BUT NOT FOR THE LAST. the transition debate is important to examine the first time capitalism emerged in the world, but once emerged that does not preclude different situations allowing for capitalism to grow. Thus, when it hits japan, capitalism will be different already, and will grow out of the ‘native’ conditions it finds itself But the question of what exactly is capitalism is thus important. As woods argues, liberals (and these days conservatives as well) want to argue that capitalism always existed and it only had to emerge fully formed from its fetters in order for us to enjoy all of its benefits…As a marxist, do you not find that curious?
3)i dont understand your labeling of brenner, is this to indicate that he is not some form of marxist?
jeremias
ps comninel is one of my former prof’s, one fot he best prof’s i have ever know. You do know that woods was his thesis adivisor, no?
Comment by jeremias — June 15, 2008 @ 4:45 pm