
Johnny Sanchez
A guest post by Johnny Sanchez
(Read interview with Sanchez here.)
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There is an old Jewish proverb that says: “A half-truth is a whole lie.”
I recently came across an article written by Sam Farber entitled “Contradictions of Cuba’s foreign policy” that appears in the ISO newspaper. I found this article fascinating because it went on to claim how self-interested Castro is and, because of such, Cuba therefore has no real relationship to true revolution.
Farber declares that “while it is true that Cuba has followed a consistent policy of opposition to U.S.-sponsored imperialism, it has not followed that policy towards other imperialist aggressors. In fact, the Cuban government has taken the side of oppressor states on various occasions…. [and] also supported the suppression of the Eritrean national movement in the 1970’s.” Farber then asks: “How can we explain the contradictory policies of Cuba regarding the right of nations to self-determination?”
I was genuinely intrigued by Farber’s questions and comments because A) I love to learn about history and B) I visited Cuba and found myself inspired by its people and the Cuban nation – so much so that while in Cuba I better understood the meaning of Frederick Douglass’ quote “without struggle there is no progress”. So, naturally, I was inclined to question Farber’s article because I wanted to understand his point of view.
So, what did I do? I found a book that supports Sam Farber’s claims in regards to Cuba’s policy, but more specifically in relation to Eritrea’s independence movement. Further, to keep objectivity -with my limitations and all, I questioned what I found in that book as much as I could. The book in question is Eritrea: a Pawn in World Politics written by Okbazghi Yohannes.
In the book, Yohannes comments that in 1966 “Cuba had warmly embraced Eritrean nationalism as an indigenously authentic and internationally credible movement”. He then writes that some Eritrean guerillas received their drilling in Cuba and also states that Castro’s advocacy for Eritrea’s inclusion in the nonaligned movement helped Eritreans obtain their anti-imperialist credentials. In addition, Yohannes says, that Cuban propaganda organs gave ample coverage and analysis to the Eritrean movement. He says that, “Cuba’s public affirmation of the justness of the Eritrean and Somali struggles represented an open repudiation of Ethiopia’s imperial acquisition”. This affirmation was justified on the basis of the principle of national self-determination for the Eritreans, and the Cubans placed such support within the context of “proletarian internationalism”.
But he then goes on to claim that although, at first, Castro characterized the Eritrean struggle against Ethiopian as positive that he later changed his mind. He accuses Castro, of being an opportunist who did a full about face against Eritrean Liberation and even went as far as saying that Castro categorized their movement as similar to the southern secessionism in the United States during the Civil War.
The problem with this analysis is that Yohannnes has no direct quotes from Castro that support this ‘about face’ claim… nor does he give a date as to when Castro said any of this. All I am supposed to do is just trust that Castro said this somewhere -at sometime.
He then uses the February 1977 trip of Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, a high-ranking Cuban Military official, to Ethiopia as evidence that Cuba struck military plans to defend Ethiopia against Eritrean Independence. Although, in the same sentence, he admits that the real reason for Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez’s 1977 trip was not clear. This only leaves one obvious answer; Yohnnes can’t make claims of a Castro about face if he doesn’t have clear evidence of why Arnaldo went to Ethiopia, and much less if he can’t find a direct quote from Castro against Eritrea.
Yohannes then relates that in December of 1977 Cuban troops were airlifted from Havana, Angola and the Congo to Ethiopia and that by April 1978 the number of Cuban troops deployed to the Horn reached 17,000.
Still, Yohannes never bothers to relate how big the Horn is: Answer: The coastline of the Horn is bigger than the Eastern United States -actually, a whole lot bigger! In other words, that would be like directly blaming US Military Personal stationed in Key West for Canada’s successful suppression of Québec’s Independence Movement.
Yohannes also states that 3,000 soldiers had been airlifted to Asmara where they immediately began probing the operational strength of the Eritrean guerillas in the vicinity. – But what does he mean by the phrase ‘probing the operational strength of the Eritrean guerillas in the vicinity’? That can mean anything! It can even mean they were there to help the Eritrean guerillas. In other words, he never explains what ‘probing’ means. He just throws terms around to vaguely convey any ideas he wants to promote.
But this is where his biggest blunder is: he goes on to say that in 1980 there were at least 3,500 Cubans in Eritrea fighting alongside the Ethiopians and that Cuba’s involvement in the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict is “certainly dubious and even unconscionable”. He asks, why was Cuba willing to support the Eritrean’s desire for independence early on but not why later on? He then says that an objective analysis can help probe this question and his eventual conclusion is similar to Sam Farber’s accusations, that Castro is opportunistic and not interested in anyone but his own selfish needs.
Well, I agree with him in one thing, we do need to have objective analysis. But my idea of an objective analysis means looking at the whole story, and not just half of it, so that we may question everything. So, since I don’t see him doing that, let me pick up where I feel he left off and try to be objective. For starters, I will cite a report by the US on Cuba because, as we know, the US government has nothing pretty to report when it comes to Cuba. So, let’s start with an official US Intelligence report on Cuba to see where it goes; and rest assured that US reports do not try to favor Cuba or Castro in a positive light.
I have obtained materials from the US Department of State entitled “Cuban support for terrorism and insurgency in the Western Hemisphere”. As you see, even the title is not positive for Cuba because it claims Cuba’s support of terrorism. To continue, Assistant Secretary Thomas O. Enders originally presented the data on these materials as testimony on March 12th, 1982. This was, of course, during the height of the Cold War -when the US kept stealthy watch of Cuba’s military actions. This data was later presented again by Powell Allen Moore in front of the United States Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee on the Judiciary, on July 21st 1982. Powell Allen Moore was the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations in the 1980’s (aka Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs) and US Senator for Alabama Jeremiah Denton, a former Navy Admiral, was the Chairman of the Committee.
The data on this report is very thorough and it asks the following question:
“What is the status of the discipline, morale and effectiveness of the Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia? Have there been defections and desertions from the ranks? The Cubans have said that the first military contingents to reach Angola were elite Ministry of Interior Units. What has become of these units? Please furnish the subcommittee with the Department’s complete assessment of Cuban involvement, military and otherwise, in Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Zaire and Ethiopia. Please give a separate answer to each country.”
That was just question 12 on the report, and as you can see it is not a short one. The whole compiled Intel and data is even longer. The details gathered are very specific and breaks down Cuba’s military activities and actions in each country cited above. Since the focus of this article is Ethiopia and Eritrea then I’ll relate all the materials gathered on Cuba’s actions concerning that area only, and as reported to the US Department of State:
On the question of Ethiopia and Eritrea the report states:
There are now between 11,000 -13,000 Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia. The military presence is down from a high of about 17,000 troops in early 1978, when Cuban forces played a decisive role in the successful Ogaden campaign. After completion of these operations, Chairman Mengistu tried to persuade Havana to help Ethiopia with the fighting taking place in Eritrea. Castro refused, partly because he wanted no further casualties and partly because he believed the political costs would be too heavy and cause friction with Cuba’s radical Arab allies. (Havana also had had ties with the Eritrean Liberation Front for many years.) The Cuban military presence was reduced in late 1978 and remains at about 11,000 -13,000 today. Cuban forces do not see much action now, play mainly support and logistic-support roles and remain in garrisons most of the time.
Havana would like to increase its civilian role in Ethiopia, mainly to earn hard currency, but so far these efforts have been unsuccessful. There are several hundred (perhaps 600 700) Cuban civilians in Ethiopia.
Even the US Department, a sworn enemy of Cuba and invested on making them look bad, reported in 1982, Castro refused Mengistu’s request to help Ethiopia with the fighting taking place in Eritrea. The report clearly states Cuba played a decisive role in the Ogaden campaign but when it comes to Eritrea – Castro refused and Cuban forces mostly remain in garrisons.
How come Sam Farber and Okbazghi Yohannes can’t quote actual Intel reports? How come they don’t investigate their accusations further?
As a matter of fact, all they had to do was go into the ‘Country Studies Series by Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress’ to get more information on this. Even the Library of Congress says that “Although there is some disagreement, most military observers believe that Cuba refused to participate in the operation in Eritrea because Castro considered the Eritrean conflict an internal war rather than a case of external aggression.”
Instead, Farber and Yohannes want me take them at their word, their own individual assertions, and want me to accept these personal claims that since Cuba had troops in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia then it must mean Cuba purposefully and intentionally suppressed the Eritrea Independence Movement. This is like believing that because the US Army has invaded Iraq then it must be successfully suppressing forces of Al-Qaeda in neighboring Afghanistan –so much for that argument. Hasn’t Sam Farber learned yet that apples and oranges don’t compare as neatly as we’d like them to?
Even Jorge I. Dominguez in the book To Make a World Safe for a Revolution, who Farber quotes in his own article Contradictions of Cuba’s Foreign Policy, wrote “Cuba was able to assure African countries that its commitment [to Ethiopia] was confined to a specific task.” Mr. Dominguez then opines that, although Cuba did confine its task to Ogaden, Cuba unwittingly aided Ethiopia in suppressing Eritrean independence because Ethiopia was able to send troops to Eritrea while Cuba fought for them in the Ogaden against the Somali invasion. Dominguez does not accuse Castro of purposefully suppressing Eritrean Independence – where as Farber does do that in his ISO article and conveniently leaves out the part of Dominguez’s writings that say Cuba assured African countries that its commitment [to Ethiopia] was confined to a specific task. Yohaness and Farber only use what they want and, sadly, ignore the whole story.
Still, if one argues that because Cuba sent troops to the Ogaden it unknowingly and unwittingly supported Ethiopia against Eritrea Independence then we must then ask what would have resulted if the opposite had occurred? Meaning, what if Cuba had not supported Ethiopia in its fight against Somalia’s invasion? Would it then mean Eritrean independence would have been easier?
So, let’s really objectively ask that question and, to really delve into it, let’s look at all the players and honestly find what could’ve occurred if Cuba had not gotten involved.
The Ogaden War was a conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia in the late 1970’s over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. By 1980, the United States had officially adopted Somalia as a Cold War client state in exchange for use of Somali bases, and as a way to exert political influence upon the region of the Horn. Interestingly, however, Ethiopia at one point had been backed by the USA. But, please, don’t take my word for it… let’s look at the full scale of chronological events from sources who can better verify the events.
David A. Korn, United States Ambassador to Togo and US diplomat who spent 37 months in Ethiopia, wrote a book titled Ethiopia, the United States, and the Soviet Union.
Mr. Korn writes that the Ethiopians asked the US for support since threats from Somalia were growing. But although the US had big investments in Ethiopia, it was reluctant to give any further military support and aid since the pains of Vietnam were still fresh.
Eventually, the pleas for help from Ethiopia grew louder and hit world center stage. Therefore, the US decided to supply Ethiopia with about $180 Million in aid between 1974-1977. Interestingly though (during the time the US was enjoying relations with Ethiopia) Cuba and the USSR were slowly building strong relations with Ethiopia; and all of this occurred while Somalia, Cuba and the Soviet Union were still close allies.
It gets even more complicated and, as Mr. Korn notes, things got heated in Ethiopia with both the USSR and the US there at the same time so “Washington decided to make a public move” and by the end of 1977, the US decided to give no further aid, both financial and military wise, to Ethiopia.
The reason for cutting off support to Ethiopia, the US claimed, was because Ethiopia had violated human rights. So, while the US cut support to Ethiopia, Cuba and the USSR maintained closed ties to both Ethiopia and Somalia -but this posed a problem for them.
Mr. Korn relates that: “As the Soviets publicly embraced Ethiopia, they began to consider what to do about the dilemma that this posed for their relations with Somalia”, since Somalia kept expressing aggression towards Ethiopia and wanted control of the Ogaden.
This is where Cuba steps in hoping to create an accord which prompted Castro to try his hand at a peaceful solution and, as Mr. Korn describes, “in mid-march of 1977, surprise visits to Ethiopia and Somalia by Fidel Castro and a secret meeting between Mengistu (of Ethiopia) and Siad Barre (of Somalia) in Aden. There the Cuban [leader] proposed to the Ethiopian and Somali leaders that they should burry the differences between their countries in a federation together with South Yemen, in which the Ogaden and Eritrea would enjoy a status of autonomy. Notice how it states that Castro was thinking of Eritrean autonomy in this peaceful accord. But the attempt at peace was in vain.
Aggressions between both African nations grew and many people demanded that the US take a side and that the USSR, along with Cuba, also choose a side. So, in the midst of this, Somalia started to put its feelers out to Washington in hopes of getting any kind of support there. By this point, Ethiopia terminated its relations with the USA, since no further aid was coming from there. But, Cuba and the USSR still kept ties with Somalia.
And in response, “As early as March 1977 Vice President Mondale sent Carter a memorandum advocating rapprochement with Somali”, former Ambassador Korn also tells that “On June 16th, of that year, Carter received a visit from Somali Ambassador Addou” and the Somali expressed that if Somalia got American support they “would shift allegiance from the Soviets to the United States.” Korn tells that Carter had hesitations. Still, Carter expressed support for Somalia if it was ‘genuinely’ threatened by Ethiopia.
The Somalis took advantage of Carter’s support on the basis of defense and, on July 9th, the Somali Embassy in Washington created a long list of military equipment that was desired from the United States. On July 15th Carter approved a decision ‘in principle’ to help meet Somalia’s ‘defensive requirements’ -Korn relates all of this based on his expertise and years of relationships in Washington.
The Somalis welcomed the support and on July 25th Washington announced it. Barely a week later, Somalia forces were operating in the Ogaden and the Carter administration found itself in a conflict. Although, at this point, the US had yet to give Somalia a blank check – so to avoid any further conflicts, the US stopped further support of Somalia until 1982 where the US decided to clearly give Somalia official military and financial aid.
Regardless, the damage was done by 1977 since Somali forces swept into Ethiopia by then -and though the US had not sent them military aid yet it had publicly announced support of Somalia. Korn clarifies that if the US really wanted to avoid any blunders: “the United States should have taken this into account in its dealings with [Somalia].”
Still, the US did gain something out of this ‘blunder’ and that was military intelligence, which Korn well describes: ‘US Intelligence on the Somali invasion of Ethiopia was very good. When the Somalis invaded, the United States knew almost exactly where they were, when, and how they got there.” This is where we see that, though reluctant at first, the US did eventually find a reason for formalizing aid to Somalia. Through this, we see the US became a player in the Horn because it gained strategic military Intel in the region.
Korn tells of Dr. Kevin Cahill, an American who was a personal physician to Somalia’s President, and says that “Dr. Cahill alleged he was told in the spring of 1977 by a State Department Official that the United States was ‘not averse to further guerrilla pressure in the Ogaden.” Mr. Korn explains that “Dr. Cahill was a frequent caller at the offices of the White House Domestic Staff.” He further explains that Dr. Cahill “meticulously avoided officials of the NSC and the State Department who had responsibility for the Horn of Africa”. Why would a physician avoid public officials so meticulously? Personally, I think that tells a lot about the back door dealings the United States prefers.
One thing is clear, and as Korn relates “The Somalis had been preparing to seize the Ogaden for years.” Of course, the Somali’s sought support (even if only verbal) to back their invasion and this is where the US, even if reluctant at first, becomes a player.
As we know, Somalia invaded Ethiopia and their advances were stopped by the USSR and Cuba (not by the US) and Korn expresses a personal view here: ‘So long as they were defending Ethiopia’s territorial integrity from Somali invasion, the Ethiopians and the Soviets [along with the Cubans] had the moral and political high ground.”
On October 19th, Korn describes, “the Soviet Ambassador in Addis Ababa issued a statement, quickly broadcast by Ethiopian radio, announcing ‘officially and formally’ that ‘the Soviet Union has stopped arms supplies to Somalia’.” Of course the Somalis were outraged and, from here on, relations became strained and Somalia ordered all Soviets and Cubans to leave and on November 13th, 1977 Siad Barre officially announced his break of relations with Cuba and the USSR.
The Cubans were very successful in stopping the Somali invasion and the Somali attack collapsed in March 1978. Right after this collapse, the US was sceptical about giving any more support, verbal or otherwise, to Somalia until two major events occurred – the Iranian Hostage Crisis (November 1979) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980).
These events prompted the well-known ‘Carter Doctrine’ that formalized military bases in Somalia, all in the name of security. In August of 1980 the US signed an official agreement with Somalia allowing US access to air and port facilities (most notably at Berbera – just north of the Ogaden) and from that moment on Somalia clearly received $65 million in military aid over three years. By 1982, US support to Somalia increased.
In the summer of 1982 the US sent ammunitions, arms, air defense equipment and transport, and communications and engineering supplies to Somalia in support of its war against Ethiopia. As The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (a group dedicated to news and analysis from and about the Middle East and U.S. policy in there) reported on February 7, 1983: “The U.S. justified last summer’s emergency arms shipments on the grounds that Somalia was not doing the attacking, but was being attacked.”
Consequently, due to this military defense aid, the Horn becomes a region where a war can break out again – backed with official US support now and in the name of defense. So, Cuba clearly keeps a military presence to suppress any further invasions by Somalia.
Seeing how the chronological events unfolded and how the US eventually gave military aid to Somalia, we can conclude that had Cuba had not kept a presence in the Ogaden Ethiopia might have fallen. Further, if Somalia’s invasion had ever been successful would they allow Eritrea to be independent afterwards? Can we accept that a Somali invasion would have favored Eritrean freedom while Castro only wanted to purposefully stall it?
I hope it’s obvious to you, as it is to me, that had Somalia been successful in invading Ethiopia their hunger for control of the Horn would not have stopped there but continued.
As well, after 1980, if Cuba had immediately left Ethiopia, can we naively believe that Somalia would not try to re-invade?
Still, to keep objective, and if you are the kind of person who wishes to argue that if, after 1980, had Somalia re-invaded Ethiopia with US support (the Carter Doctrine) that America would have spread freedom to Eritrea because that is America’s goal -freedom.
Well, to go back to reports Based on the Country Studies Series by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress “A large Cuban contingent, believed to number 12,000, remained in Ethiopia after the Ogaden War. However, by mid 1984 Havana had reduced its troop strength in Ethiopia to approximately 3,000. In 1988 a Cuban brigade, equipped with tanks and APC’s, was stationed in Dire Dawa to guard the road and railroad between Ethiopia and Djibouti, following attacks by Somali-supported rebels.”
It is evident that after 1980 Somalia kept finding ways to invade Ethiopia and Cuba kept guarding. I don’t think that a Somalia invasion of Ethiopia, even with US support, would have brought freedom to Eritrea. I say that because I assume we all know to well the US’s suppression of left wing progressive movements based in Africa, Latin America and Asia
– and all while, many times, supporting right wing suppressive movements.
But in case you are not sure what I mean, and to keep questioning, I will quote a document created in 1966 (slightly over a decade before the Ogaden War) by the US Government. This document was entitled The Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian, and Latin American Peoples -A Staff Study. This ‘staff study’ was prepared for the Subcommittee in charge of investigating the Administration of Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate. Again, this ‘study’ was printed in 1966 and it discusses The Tricontinental Conference that took place in Cuba in that same year.
This ‘staff study’ reports the following:
An event of outstanding importance to the Free World took place in Havana on January 3 of this year. The Cuban capital was the site of what was probably the most powerful gathering of pro-Communist, anti-American forces in the history of the Western Hemisphere.
In other words, the ‘study’ states that an event occurred in Cuba that the ‘free world’ must keep an eye on because it is pro-Communist, anti-American and very powerful. The ‘study’ continues:
The first Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian, and Latin American Peoples, as it was called, was convened in the Hall of the Ambassadors at the once-swank Habana Libre Hotel (formerly the Havana Hilton Hotel) in Havana, Cuba. In all, there were 83 groups from countries on three continents-reportedly represented by approximately 513 delegates, 64 observers and 77 invited guests. These groups included 27 Latin American delegations.
Asian countries were represented by 197 delegates, while African countries had 150, and the 27 Latin American groups comprised 165 delegates.
The ‘study’ then goes on to give its opinion on Cuba, Communism and the people present… it’s rather lengthy so I will spare you. But the most interesting part is where the following opinion is shared:
The gravity of the threat posed by the Tricontinental Conference is the subject of a recent study prepared by the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the Organization of American States at its sixth regular meeting. Its study concluded:
That the so-called first Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples’ Solidarity Conference constitutes a positive threat to the free peoples of the world, and, on the hemisphere level, represents the most dangerous and serious threat that international communism has yet made against the inter-American system. It is necessary and urgent, for the purpose of adequately defending democracy:
a. That the [proven] intervention of communism in the internal affairs of the American Republics be considered as aggression, since it constitutes a threat to the security of the hemisphere.
b. That the American governments define their position regarding the present treatment of every kind to be given to communism, and that they consequently adopt coordinated measures that will lead to the common goals.
In other words, the ‘study’ concludes that the gathering of the people of color through out the world (note: this is not a report on European peoples), and which occurred in Cuba, constitutes the most positive threat yet made against the inter-American system.
In other words, whenever people of color gather to discuss their needs and independence, especially in Cuba, then it is a threat to American society. This is a fascinating ‘study’ but, please, let’s continues our questioning of things before we reach any conclusions.
This gathering was also labeled an aggression since it poses a threat to the hemisphere. Based on that supposed aggression, the American government a) must make its position clear and b) adapt coordinated measures to reach its goals. Fascinating word: goals.
What are these goals? In case the reader needs this spelled out, and in hopes of objective analysis, but to also keep this short: I highly recommend the book “Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent”. It spells out what these goals are and how it is the US maintains security in Latin America, but more so, what that actually means for all people of color who seek independence, progress and social reform.
So, to continue and taking the above into consideration, Farber ignores the counter argument that had Cuba NOT fought Somalia in the Ogaden -then Eritrean independence may not be a reality today because if the US had claimed more control in that region (via the Carter Doctrine) you can bet that the continued existence of any Eritrean liberation (whether by the ELF or EPLF) and their fight for Independence would’ve been harder.
Case in point, since Somalia lost in the Ogaden, therefore, the US could only exert influence within a limited area of the Horn region. So much so, that in 1993 Eritrea was able to successfully free itself from Ethiopian rule and today it is an independent nation.
As we know, Eritrea is independent of Ethiopia today. So, why can’t Farber or Yohannes accept that since Cuba helped stop a Somali invasion it made it easier for Eritrea to eventually gain independence? Instead, they both just seem intent on avoiding the whole story, the complex possibilities of it all and only tell us a small portion of the events.
Sadly many left-wing socialist organizations also simply take Sam Faber at his word… such as the ISO… and never challenge or even bother to question claims against Cuba and, instead, it seems as if they rather cut down Cuba’s positive accomplishments rather then acknowledge them.
I mention the ISO, in particular, because they’ve gained a lot of respect but when it comes to Farber they’ve dropped the ball since they print much of what he writes without always fact checking the whole story. If the ISO had done their homework on these half-truths then they would’ve found out that Cuba and Eritrea had good relations before the1980’s, during the 1980’s and after the 1980’s.
But, rather than just make my own claims about Cuban and Eritrean relations, I’ll simply cite an official statement. In a bulletin dated March 17th, 2007, and published on the official website of the EMBASSY OF THE STATE OF ERITREA in SOUTH AFRICA (http://www.eritreaembassy.co.za/Embassy%20Bulletin/March%2015%202007.htm), the Eritrean government states the following in regards to cooperation between Cuba and Eritrea: “ Eritrean-Cuban relations and cooperation has registered satisfactory achievement and represents an exemplary development.”
Strange, no mention of any Cuban betrayals or even about-faces, past or present.
All I ask of Yohannes and Farber is for them to tell the whole story and not just what they want to tell. Otherwise, it just looks like ‘hate’. So I ask the reader, the ISO and its members, Sam Farber, and also of Yohannes to keep objective analysis and avoid any demonization since that is the best commitment to keeping the whole truth alive.
Does that mean Cuba is free of criticism? Of course not! My point is, we have an obligation to tell the whole truth and not half of it. Otherwise, we create lies and there’s no better way to promote hate than with lies. The ISO must fact-check everything, even an article written by one of its friends: Sam Farber. Otherwise, they’ll come across like just ‘hating’ on Cuba and, as you know, hatred and revolution do not go hand in hand.
Like I said, Cuba is not perfect. But there is a difference between objectively critiquing a country’s policies and between helping to demonize it by leaving out the whole story.
So, please, remember the old Yiddish proverb: “A half-truth is a whole lie.”